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THE MARRIAGE PENALTY/BONUS DEBATE IN BLACK AND WHITE

ProfessorDorothy A. Brown
PROF. BROWN:* Many scholars have debated the marriage
penalty bonus issue, some this morning. Those scholars have
proposed solutions ranging from individual filing requirements to
increased deductions for secondary wage earners. I submit, all such
solutions have limited impact because they are built upon a model in
which all women are assumed to be the same. If a solution to the
marriage penalty/bonus issue is to help women in today's society,
those differences must be explored. I would like to begin by
introducing you to what is this marriage penalty/bonus that we have
been talking about all morning.
By and large, the marriage penalty/bonus issue is a function of
how husbands and wives contribute income to their households. If
you look at income allocation, you have the 0 percent/100 percent
category, which is what the earlier panel referred to as sole wageearner households, we have 10/90, 20/80, 30/70, 40/60 and 50/50
income allocations between spouses. I want you to focus on the
extremes. The 100/0 category has all positive numbers that is called
the marriage bonus. Whenever you have a household where one
individual works in the paid labor market and is the sole paid labor
earner you will have a marriage bonus. Let's look at the other
extreme, the 50/50 extreme. This gets you into the marriage penalty
category. The penalty is the most extreme in households where the
husbands and wives contribute equal amounts to household income. I
believe it is a little peculiar that the Internal Revenue Code would
discourage the formation of families where spouses are coequal
providers, but I digress. So, we see these different categories and the
penalty in the 40/60 category. One of the interesting things about this
and the statistics brought out in the earlier panel, is that you have no
knowledge regarding which couples pay the marriage penalty and
Professor of law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; B.A., Fordham
University; J.D., Georgetown Law Center; LL.M., New York University.
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which couples receive.the marriage bonus.
My scholarship has been dedicated to uncovering the racial
impact of the federal tax laws. That is a little difficult to do since the
Internal Revenue Service does not keep statistics by race. What I
have done is use a proxy for the Internal Revenue Service statistics,
which is Census Bureau data, and I would like to share with you some
of my results.' First, we begin by looking at African-American
household income allocation between husband and wife, in particular,
the contribution percentages. At the $0 to $10,000 income level
approximately 84 percent of households are sole wager-earner
households, about 5 percent of which are in the marriage penalty
category. A substantial amount - 63.25% - is in the marriage
bonus category when you get to the $10,000 to $20,000 income level.
I would submit to you that part of why we have sole wage
earners at low-income levels is a function of how the Earned Income
Tax Credit works. One of the things that the literature on the Earned
Income Tax Credit has not done is really show us which taxpayers are
most likely to benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit. We know
who it is written for, but who actually takes advantage of it? So far,
the scholarly literature has not addressed this issue and it is one of my
summer projects.
Now, if you move up in the income category, you see the
largest percentage of households are in the marriage penalty
contribution category. My data shows that a disproportionate amount
of African-American married couples pay a marriage penalty; they are
in the 60/40, 50/50 split. Notice the category increases to 33 percent,
38, 43, 46, and to almost 50 percent at the upper income levels. You
see that the highest percentages of African-American couples are in
the penalty category. 33 percent is greater than any other category
and it does not change until we get to $120,000 and over category,
then we have more Black couples in the bonus category than in the
penalty category.
If you look at White households, you see some major
differences, but you also see one similarity that I would like to point
out at the lower income levels. Again, we have abbut 87 percent of
See also Dorothy Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative
Issues in Black and White, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287 (1999).
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White, low-income households with sole wager-earners earning under
$10,000 and we had 63.25 percent of the African-American
households, if you remember the statistics, earning under $20,000.
These numbers are very close. Again, I submit to you, it is more a
function of how the Earned Income Tax Credit works and the
penalties within the Earned Income Tax Credit that really force
couples to have only one wage earner. Now, in the marriage bonus
category for White households, you see higher percentages in the
marriage bonus category and you also see lower percentages in the
marriage penalty category. One thing that is interesting, in White
households earning between $60,000 and $90,000, there are more
households paying the marriage penalty than are 'eceiving the
marriage bonus. As such, middle income White households are more
likely to pay a penalty than they are to receive a bonus.
When you compare White and Black households, with respect
to the marriage bonus, you see that in every category there is a higher
percentage of White households receiving a marriage bonus than
African-American households. Although I will acknowledge that
limiting my research to White and Black households does a disservice
to all the other racial and ethnic groups, I can not tell you how
difficult it was to get the White and Black data. For a future research
project of mine, I will have a richer examination of minority
households. Thus, we see at every single income level a significantly
greater amount of White households that receive the marriage bonus.
Concerning the marriage penalty we have the opposite results.
At every income level what we see are African-American couples
paying the penalty or a higher percentage of African-American
couples in the penalty category than there are in White households.
Therefore, at every single household income level you notice a great
disparity. This is particularly true when we are talking about the fact
that 40 to almost 50 percent of Black married couples at those income
levels are paying a penalty as compared to White couples that are
paying a penalty.
One of the problems I have with the literature, generally, is it
treats all women the same. All women are not the same, particularly,
when we are talking about women who are co-providers. Those coproviders are, for the most part, African-American woman who are
contributing equal amounts to household income, as well as White
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middle income wives, who are contributing roughly equal
amounts to
2
household income in the $60,000 to $90,000 category.
What does this tell us with respect to proposed legislation?
First of all, I want to discuss a few proposals. Increasing the standard
deduction would increase the standard deduction for joint returns to a
level exactly twice that of an individual return. It would not,
however, eliminate the marriage penalty for those filing itemized
deductions; it only addresses those that are standard deduction
taxpayers. I have been able to get Internal Revenue Service statistics
that suggest that in 1996, of those married and filing jointly,
approximately 54 percent filed using itemized deductions and 46
percent filed using the standard deductions. 3 Therefore, based on the
1996 tax return data, the majority of taxpayers filing joint returns
would not be greatly assisted by this proposal.
Another proposal is adjusting the Earned Income Tax Credit.
The effectiveness of this proposal will depend upon which couples
benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit and very little scholarly
research has been done that examines who actually benefits from the
Earned Income Tax Credit. My data suggests, however, that the
majority of the households eligible are single wage-earner households,
as we just discussed.4 One legislative solution is to increase the
Earned Income Tax Credit phase-out, which would minimize those
taxpayers losing the Earned Income Tax Credit. I think, this is
certainly a worth while proposal, particularly given the similarity
between White and Black households at the lower income levels. This
proposal would help both groups. One of my concerns is that
whatever proposal we come up with, I do not want to
disproportionately help White households and disproportionately hurt
the Black households. Ameliorating the marriage penalty and the
Earned Income Tax Credit, I submit, would improve things for Black
as well as White households.
Another proposal is widening the tax brackets for joint tax
returns. While this will eliminate the marriage penalty, assuming we
2 See id. at 293-94, tbls.l.2 & 1.3.
3See id. at 300.

4 See id.

